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METAPHORS OF INFRINGEMENT AND
EQUIVALENCE: THE SOLUTION OF
OUR PROBLEMS
An Iranian student, shortly after his arrival in
Berkeley, took a seminar on metaphor from one of
us. Among the wondrous things that he found in
Berkeley was an expression that he heard over and
over and understood as a beautifully sane metaphor.
The expression was "the solution of my problems" -
which he took to be a large volume of liquid, bub-
bling and smoking, containing all your problems,
either dissolved or in the form of precipitates, with
catalysts constantly dissolving some problems (for
the time being) and precipitating out others. He was
terribly disillusioned to find that the residents of
Berkeley had no such chemical metaphor in mind.
And well he might be...'
INTRODUCTION: EQUIVALENCE AND INFRINGEMENT
The doctrine of equivalents has been a fixture in patent litigation
since well before its putative birth in the 1853 case of Winans v.
Denmead.2 Over the past ten years, it has been the subject of
continuing debate within the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.3 The court has vacillated between a desire to preserve the
doctrine as part of the courts' equitable powers,' and a desire to
I G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE BY, 143-44 (1980).
2 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
' The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 to
provide exclusive appellate jurisdiction for patent and certain other cases. See Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended
in several sections of 28 U.S.C.).
'See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding satellite controlled by on-board computer infringes earlier patent
by doctrine of equivalents even though not literally inflinging); Texas Instruments, Inc. v.
United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(holding later generation calculators do not infringe by virtue of reverse doctrine of
equivalents, even though literally infiinging).
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yield more predictable decisions on infringement by constraining its
use.5 Commentators have discussed extensively this conflict facing
the Federal Circuit.6 Further, the doctrine is presently the subject
of an en banc hearing by the court
Despite appearing to be a limited doctrinal debate, the controver-
sy over the doctrine is representative of an anomaly pervasive in
patent law: the inability of language-patent claims-to sufficient-
ly define an invention. The doctrine of equivalents has been viewed
perennially as a means of compensating for the inadequacy of
words.8 However, several judges in the Federal Circuit are of the
opinion that current doctrine on equivalents and claim interpreta-
tion9 is too open-ended, which undermines the predictability of the
I See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding computerized sorter does not infringe by doctrine of
equivalents because lacking elements equivalent to patented machine).
I See, eg., Ronald E. Larson, Balancing the Competing Policies Underlying the Doctrine
of Equivalents in Patent Law, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1993) (attempting to harmonize decisions
under doctrine of equivalents using functional cooperation analysis); Paul C. Crasne, At the
Boundaries of Law and Equity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 105 (1992) (arguing for limiting doctrine of equivalents
to cases of piracy); Maxim H. Waldbaum, Pennwalt Redux-Judicial Uncertainty vs.
Procrustean Bed, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 237 (1991) (arguing recent Federal Circuit decisions
undermine flexibility of doctrine of equivalents); Martin J. Adelman et al., The Doctrine of
Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
673 (1989) (arguing that doctrine of equivalents represents judicial undermining of statutory
design).
7 In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner.Jenkinson Co., No. 93-1088, the court has
certified the following questions for review:
1. Does a finding of patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
require anything in addition to proof of the facts that there are the same
or substantially the same (a) function, (b) way, and (c) result, the so-
called triple identity test of Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products Co., 339
U.S. 605 (1950), and cases relied on therein? If yes, what?
2. Is application of the doctrine of equivalents by the trial court to find
infiingement of the patentee's right to exclude, when there is no literal
infringement of a claim, discretionary in accordance with the circum-
stances of the case?
3. Is the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents an
equitable remedy to be decided by the court, or is it, like literal infringe-
ment, an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury case?
'See Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396-400 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
'In addition to consideration of the doctrine of equivalents, the court has certified two
more cases for en banc hearing, each dealing with claim interpretation. Pall Corp. v. Micron
Separations, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Mass. 1992), appeal fled, Nos. 91-1391,91-1394, and
91-1409 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 1994); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535
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patent grant, and, hinders technological innovation." This
rekindles a controversy which has preceded the Winans decision.
Although there seems to be a consensus in favor of designing the
patent system to support innovation and maximize aggregate
economic benefit, there are widely disparate theories on how to
achieve these goals. The theories tend to fall into two groups. One
group disfavors the uncertainty generated by the doctrine of
equivalents and argues that it undermines adequate notice to
innovators working at the margins of existing patents." The
other group stresses the need to preserve the doctrine under the
courts' general equitable powers in order to do justice in individual
cases, and thus, maintain the integrity of patent rights and the
incentives they provide.'
(E.D. Pa. 1991), appeal filed, No. 92-1049 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 1994).
" See, eg., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (asserting that doctrine of equivalents threatens to render patent claims
uncertain); An Interview with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Dec. 1993,
at 2.
" A typical argument for "order" is found in Martin J. Adelman & Gary L Francione, The
Doctrine of Equivalents: Questions That Penwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673
(1989). According to Adelman and Francione:
"[t]he doctrine of equivalents is the primary ... cause of the current
uncertainty surrounding the scope of patent claims... uncertainty about
the scope of patent protection hinders both patent holders and potential
defendants from assessing the possible outcome of litigation or from
making other business decisions .... due process concerns are potential-
ly raised to the extent that pervasive and systemic uncertainty generated
by the doctrine of equivalents destroys the ability of patent claims to
provide fair notice, so that they effectively provide no notice.
Id. at 682-83.
'A typical equity" argument is found in Maxim H. Waldbaum, PennwaltRedux-Judic-
ial Uncertainty us. Procrustean Bed, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 237 (1991). Criticizing the Federal
Circuit's adoption of an "all-elements" restriction on the doctrine of equivalents, Waldbaum
states:
[t]he problem with [the all elements rule] is its lack of flexibility.
Patent lawyers do not always draft claims with crystal clarity, nor do
they always discern perfectly what is and what is not a material claim
limitation in a claim. In some cases, to require one-to-one correspon-
dence between identical or substantially similar elements in two devices
to prove infringement is an unattainable or unfair requirement. In such
cases, the court must have the ability to go beyond the rigid rules ...
and to do equity.
Id. at 253.
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Both positions offer important insights, but tend toward myopia.
Arguments for order collapse everything into an economics problem,
as if one could bound patent scope to achieve an optimal economic
effect. Aggregate economic theories are pitifully under-equipped to
deal with such incommensurable factors. Although the presence of
indeterminacy certainly supports equity arguments, discussion of
equity does not determine whose sense of equity will prevail.
Without this sense, equity offers a rather unhelpful-and ultimate-
ly inequitable-subjectivity.
This Note aims at a modest paradigm shift between the two
views on the doctrine of equivalents. Part I presents a history of
infringement doctrine, one focusing on its dissonance. In particu-
lar, it focuses on the genesis of the conceptual split between the
notions of "literal" infringement and the doctrine of equivalents.
Part II traces the split between literal infringement and the
doctrine of equivalents to a fundamental dissonance in the ways we
talk about inventions, using tools borrowed from cognitive linguis-
tics. Specifically, these tools identify two possible metaphors
arising from the polysemy of the word "invention." These two
metaphors are INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES and INVEN-
TIONS ARE OBJECTS. Part II argues that the interaction of
these metaphors is peaceful when an invention can be clearly
characterized by one metaphor or the other. However, crisis occurs
in cases where these metaphors come into competition.
Finally, Part III addresses the status of the doctrine of equiva-
lents from this cognitive perspective. It focuses on the "copying"
model, which some members of the Federal Circuit have proposed
to solve a perceived problem with the doctrine of equivalents. In
cognitive terms, this proposed solution represents the triumph of
the INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS metaphor. Although it may be
tempting to adopt this metaphor in the name of certainty, such a
move is questionable in light of the wording of the patent laws and
their historical application. More importantly, the ascendancy of
this single metaphor of invention threatens to submerge the
diversity-ensuring INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES metaphor.
It is this metaphor which animates the doctrine of equivalents, and
much of the incentive the patent laws establish.
[Vol 2:279282
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I. EQUIVALENCE OR INFRINGEMENT?
It is impossible to set any theoretic limits to such a
doctrine, which indeed its origin forbids, since it is in
misericordiam to relieve those who have failed to
express their complete meaning. Somewhat the
same process is indeed inherent in the interpretation
of any verbal expression, and perhaps the best that
can be said is that in the case of patent claims much
greater liberties are taken than would be allowed
elsewhere. Each case is inevitably a matter of
degree, as so often happens, and other decisions have
little or no value. The usual ritual, which is so often
repeated and which has so little meaning, that the
same result must follow by substantially the same
means, does not help much in application; it is no
more than a way of stating the problem.1"
Under modem doctrine, the determination of patent infringement
has evolved into two distinct tests. First, there is the inquiry into
"literal" infringement. This is a two-step analysis, involving (1)
"interpretation" of the patent claim in the light of all useful
documents, including the specification, the drawings and the "file
wrapper,"14 and (2) construction of the claim by "reading it on" the
accused device; comparing the claim with the accused device to
determine whether the accused device contains all of the elements
found in the interpreted claim.15
Second, there is an inquiry into whether the accused device
infringes the patentee's rights by virtue of the doctrine of equiva-
lents. The doctrine holds that even though an accused device does
not literally infringe the patent, it nonetheless may infringe the
patentee's rights because the accused device utilizes the same
principle or "performs substantially the same overall function or
" Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand,
J.).
1 The "file wrapper' is the record of transactions between the applicant and the Patent
and Trademark Office.
' Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399-400, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
697 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
1994] 283
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work, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the
same overall result as the claimed invention.""' Conversely, the
doctrine allows an alleged infringer to escape liability even though
her device literally infringes the patent, if her device fails to
perform substantially the same function, in substantially the same
way, to achieve substantially the same result as the patented
invention. 17
One might ask whether the distinction between literal infringe-
ment and infringement by equivalence is a distinction without a
difference, since the purpose of both is to determine whether an
accused infringer "makes, uses or sells" the patented invention. 8
Notwithstanding this common purpose, the case law suggests that
the two doctrines are fundamentally different inquiries. 9 To
understand these two doctrines, it is important to look at the
history of patent infringement.
A. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS AS A PART OF CLAIM CONSTRUC-
TION
The history of infringement doctrine in United States patent law
is largely a history of the construction of claims. Starting with
simple descriptions, a body of technically complex claiming practice
has evolved over many years. Several factors have influenced this
evolution, including the increasing number and complexity of
inventions, the increasing complexity of economic relationships in
an industrialized society, and the increasing administrative
demands on the patent system. Intertwined with the evolution of
claiming practice, infringement doctrine has evolved from a simple
concept of "substantial similarity" to an increasingly complex
analytical procedure.
14 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
1 This is often referred to as the 'reverse doctrine of equivalents. See Texas
Instruments v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding
that pioneer patent for hand-held calculator was not infringed by later-generation devices
having same literal elements but implemented in superior next generation technologies).
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
"See, eg., Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between equivalence under § 112 and doctrine
of equivalents).
284 [Vol 2:279
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Early patent cases exhibited little of the complexity that
characterizes many patent cases today. The Patent Act of 1793
required only a "written description of... [the] invention ... in
such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all
the others."'2 There was no explicit requirement for discrete
claims set apart from the specification, and specifications from this
period were typically written in broad terms. Infringement
analysis was a somewhat gestalt process, with infringement found
if the accused device was "substantially, in [its] principles and
mode of operation, like" the patented invention," if it was not "an
improvement on the principle, or the form, or proportions" of the
patented invention, 2 or if it was "substantially the same, and
operate[d] in the same manner, to produce the same result."'
Trials included testimony by persons "acquainted with the
particular art... for the purpose of pointing out and explaining to
the jury the points of resemblance, or of difference" between the
accused device and the patented invention.2 After this testimony,
a jury was left to decide whether there was infringement.' There
was little detailed instruction on infringement; in fact, the first
Supreme Court patent case fails to mention the issue altogether.26
Courts gave patentees a great deal of flexibility when determin-
ing the scope of their patent rights. Besides forgiving less than
adequate disclosure when not accompanied by an intent to deceive,
courts also liberally construed the language of the specification.'
Asserting that patents should not be treated as monopolies "odious
to the law," Justice Story noted that the object of interpretation is:
to ascertain, what, from the fair sense of the words
of the specification, is the nature and extent of the
invention claimed by the party; and when the nature
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22 (1793).
i1 0diorne v. Winkley, 1 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
' Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710).
2 Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718).
Dixon v. Moyer, 7 F. Cas. 758, 759 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 3,931).
Id. at 759.
2 Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818).
" See Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1018 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718); Whitney v.
Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1082 (C.C.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585).
1994] 285
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and extent of that claim are apparent, not to fritter
away his rights upon formal or subtile objections of
a purely technical character ... [We are not to
single out particular phrases standing alone, but to
take the whole in connexion.'
"Mere colorable differences, or slight improvements" would not save
an accused device from a finding of infringement;' neither would
"formal differences"30 or "variance in some small matter for the
purpose of evasion, or as a colour for a patent." 1
In these early cases, a critical issue was the validity of the
patent. Under this inquiry, an important subissue was whether the
patent specification was sufficient to allow a person skilled in the
art to produce the invention. 2 Courts also focused on whether a
specification was full, clear and explicit enough to distinguish it
from all other inventions of the same type.' Although concern
about notice to potential infringers appeared in the 1820's,8' the
courts generally were not concerned with the problem of innocent
infringement at the margins of patents. As with infringement, the
adequacy of the specification was generally a jury issue.'
Although early courts were content to draw the substance of the
invention from the specification as a whole, an increasing emphasis
on distinguishing patented inventions from their predecessors led
' Ames v. Howard, 1 F. Cas. 755, 756 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No. 326).
2 Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
3* Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1016.
3' Whitney, 29 F. Cas. at 1078.
"If the specification was not enabling, the next issue was whether this defect was the
product of an intent to deceive the public. See Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556
(C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1018 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No.
5,718).
8See, eg., Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1082 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585)
("the true inquiry is whether... the plaintiffs have made such a description of the thing
patented as to distinguish it from all others before known.*).
, See Dixon v. Meyer, 7 F. Cas. 758, 760 (C.C.D. Pa. 1,821) (No. 3,931) ('[post-hoc
determination of the nature of an improvement] would afford no advantage to third persons,
and least of all to the defendant, who, if he has offended at all, did it innocently").
3See, e.g., Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 158 (C.C.D. Va. 1827) (No. 3,645) ("it is within
province of jury to decide, whether skilful workman can carry into execution plan of
inventor"); Reutgen v. Knowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710) (holding
adequacy of specification is jury question). But see Dixon v. Moyer, 7 F. Cas. 758, 760
(C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 3,931) (holding adequacy of specification not jury issue).
[Vol 2:279
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patentees to include in their applications broadly worded "claims"
set apart from the rest of the specification. Early cases made no
mention of claims.' However, rudimentary claims began to
appear in later cases.8 7 These embryonic claims would evolve into
the stylized form of modern practice.
The evolution of claiming began in earnest with the rewriting of
the Patent Act in 1836. The new Act replaced the old registration
system with a requirement that each application be examined.
Also, in order to implement this new requirement, the Act created
the administrative bureaucracy of the Patent Office.' Concomi-
tant with the creation of an examination system, the idea of
"claiming" emerged in the statutory requirements.' The creation
of the examination system and the increased emphasis on claiming
were probably a result of the increase in patent filing and the
courts' previous experience in determining patent validity.
Despite the appearance of claims, the infringement tests applied
in the courts basically remained unchanged. Courts continued
liberal construction techniques, and exhibited few references to the
need for a "literal" approach. Typical district court opinions from
the period after the enactment of the 1836 Act refer to standards
like "substantial difference in the principle' as the measure of
noninfringement. The efficacy of such a malleable standard soon
became a point of conflict.
This conflict emerged in Winans v. Denmead, the Supreme
Court case often cited as the source of the doctrine of equivalents.
"6 Neither the patent in Reutgen, issued in 1796, nor the patent in Odiorne, issued in
1799, made any mention of claims.
37 The Whitney patent issued in 1826 and its specification concluded:
(o]ur invention consists in this, a new combination of the various parts
of the mould, with the use of the pin and machinery before described, in
such a manner as without any blowing to produce a finished knob with
a hole perforated through it, and a neck or enlargement, so that it will
not come out of the mould without opening it, at one operation, by
compression merely.
Whitney, 29 F. Cas. at 1075.
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
"The Act required that the applicant "particularly point out the part, improvement, or
combination, which he claims as his own invention.* Patent Act of 1836, cl. 357, 5 Stat. 117,
119 (1836) (emphasis added).
o Smith v. Pearce, 22 F. Cas. 619, 620 (C.C.D. Ohio 1840).
41 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
1994] 287
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In Winans, the defendant was accused of infringing a patent for
coal car designs which specified a conical coal compartment. The
Court held that a jury could find that an accused device which
utilized an octagonal shape approximating a cone infringed the
patented design, even though its shape was not strictly conical.'2
The majority and dissenting opinions reflected two poles of
thought. Writing for the majority, Justice Curtis cautioned against
constraining claims to a "literal" meaning because: (1) the
inventor, having a right to the whole invention, intended to claim
that whole, and (2) the constitutional mandate of promoting the
useful arts called for securing for the inventor all she has creat-
ed.' He emphasized that "to copy the principle or mode of
operation described, is an infringement, although such copy should
be totally unlike the original in form or proportions."'
Dissenting, Justice Campbell argued that the patentee should be
held to "his precise and definite specification and claim," relying on
the Patent Act's requirement of specificity in claims.' Making an
argument that would echo across the next 140 years, he warned
that "[niothing ... will be more mischievous, more productive of
oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust preten-
sions and vexatious demands, more injurious to labor, than a
relaxation of these wise and salutary requisitions of the act of
Congress."46
Although many trace the birth of the doctrine of equivalents to
Winans, the doctrine prevailing in that case was clearly the same
gestalt infringement test of earlier cases.47 Soon after Winans, the
connection between doctrine of equivalents and the "function-way-
result" tests of earlier cases became more apparent:
If the invention of the patentee be a machine, it will
be infringed by a machine which incorporates in its
4 Id. at 344.
43 Id at 341-42.
"la
4ld1 at 345.
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1853).
"In fact, the phrase "doctrine of equivalents* was not even used in Winans. 'Doctrine
of equivalent actually did not appear until McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 402
(1857).
288 [Vol 2:279
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structure and operation the substance of the inven-
tion; that is, by an arrangement of mechanism which
performs the same service or produces the same
effect in the same way, or substantially the same
way."
In view of this similarity, it seems clear that the doctrine, as
expressed in Winans, was a restatement of the old test of patent
infringement.49 Rather than being a separate test or cause of
action, the doctrine of equivalents was an integral part of claim
construction. 50
The Supreme Court of the late nineteenth century appears to
have retained this view. In Seymour v. Osborne,1 the Court
stated that "[platentees ... are entitled in all cases to invoke to
some extent the doctrine of equivalents. 52 Similarly, in Imhaeuser
v. Buerk," the Court held that "[e]quivalents may be claimed by
a patentee of an invention consisting of a combination of old
elements or ingredients, as well as of any other patented improve-
ment, provided the arrangement of the parts composing the
invention is new, and will produce a new and useful result.""
Further, Miller v. Eagle Manufacturing Co.' referred to a "range
of equivalents" to which every patentee is entitled, based on the
nature of the invention." The same understanding of the doctrine
Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 573 (1863); see also Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas.
1015, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718) ("[W]e think it may safely be laid down as a general
rule, that where the machines are substantially the same, and operate in the same manner,
to produce the same result, they must be in principle the same'). See also Whitney v. Carter,
29 F. Cas. 1070, 1078 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810) (No. 17,583) (using similar language).
' The foregoing analysis somewhat follows that found in Harold C. Wegner, Equitable
Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and
Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1992).
' A similar conclusion is reached in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
Inc., Appeal No. 93-1088, Brief forAmicus Curiae American Bar Association, 3 FED. CI. B.J.
375, 382 (Winter 1993) ("he doctrine of equivalents is not.., an equitable 'remedy.' Nor
is it a separate cause of action... The cause of action is patent infringement...
'1 78 U.S. (1 Wall.) 516 (1870).
ld. at 556 (emphasis added).
101 U.S. 647 (1879).
Id. at 655-56.
55 151 U.S. 186 (1894).
SId. at 207.
1994] 289
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was widespread in the lower courts during the same era.6"
A consistent theme throughout this era was that while the
doctrine of equivalents was always available to patentees, the
breadth of equivalents should depend on whether an invention was
a pioneer or a mere improvement. A pioneer invention was entitled
to a liberal application of the doctrine, while a mere improvement
was entitled to only a narrow range of equivalents.' This ap-
proach somewhat represented a restatement of the thinking of
some of the early cases; to avoid infringing a new machine, an
accused infringer must show that she had essentially achieved a
new invention-or at least a very substantial improvement.5
Short of this, she risked a charge of equivalence.
B. THE CONCEPT OF LITERAL INFRINGEMENT
The view that the doctrine of equivalents was an integral part of
claim construction survived the turn of the century.' However,
' See, eg., McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 69 F. 371,393-94 (6th
Cir. 1895) (holding pioneer patent entitled to wide range of equivalents, limited only by
positive intention to limit scope); Erie Rubber Co. v. American Dunlop Tire Co., 70 F. 58, 64-
65 (3rd Cir. 1895) (holding that broad, primary inventions entitled to correspondingly broad
range of equivalents).
For example, in McCormick v. Talcott, the Court held that:
[i]f [the plaintiff] be the original inventor of the device or machine called
the divider, he will have a right to treat as infringers all who make
dividers operating on the same principle, and performing the same
functions by analogous means or equivalent combinations, even though
the infringing machine may be an improvement of the original, and
patentable as such. But if the invention claimed be itself an improve-
ment on a known machine by a mere change of form or combination of
parts, the patentee cannot treat another as an infringer who has
improved the original machine by use of a different form or combination
performing the same functions. The inventor of the first improvement
cannot invoke the doctrine of equivalents to suppress as other improve-
ments which are not mere colorable invasions of the first.
McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 402, 405 (1857). See also Imhaeuser v. Buerk,
101 U.S. 647, 656 (1879) (calling for broad application of doctrine of equivalents in case of
a "new device or an entirely new machine"); Miller, 151 U.S. at 207 (calling for broad
application of doctrine of equivalents when invention is "broad or primary in its character").
' See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
'oSee Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) (holding
that range of equivalents is based on degree of invention); Brill v. Washington Ry. & Elec.
Co., 215 U.S. 527 (1910) (holding narrow claim has little room for doctrine of equivalents);
Brothers v. United States, 250 U.S. 88 (1919) (finding no infringement of pioneer patent).
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there were growing signs of dissatisfaction with the indeterminacy
of this approach. For example, in Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix
Iron Co.,6 the Court emphasized that specific claims were statuto-
rily required, and that "courts have no right to enlarge a patent
beyond the scope of its claim.' Nonetheless, courts made little
reference to a separate test of literal infringement, distinct from
equivalence.
When did the modern test of literal infringement arise? Ironical-
ly, the concept of literal infringement can be attributed to the
Supreme Court's decision in Graver Tank & Manufacturing v.
Linde Air Products,6 the case more often known as the wellspring
for the modem doctrine of equivalents. In that case, Justice
Jackson first raised the possibility of separate legal and equitable
tests for infringement.
In determining infringement, he declared, a court must first
determine whether the accused device "falls clearly within the
claim.' If it does, "infringement is made out and that is the end
of it.' In contrast, the doctrine of equivalents6 should be
available "when proper circumstances for its application arise,"
namely to prevent a "fraud on the patent" by an "unscrupulous
copyist" who seeks to steal the invention.67
These passages from Graver Tank suggest that there is a unique
"literal" meaning which can be gleaned from the words of the claim,
sans equivalents. The legal test of infringement lies in determining
whether an accused device falls within that meaning. The doctrine
of equivalents is an equitable safety valve, available when the
During this era, many courts perceived equivalents to fall within the scope of claims. See,
e.g., Noma Elec. Corp. v. M. Goldman & Co., 60 F.2d 579 (D.C. Conn. 1932) ("(this device
is the equivalent of [the patented invention] ... as it performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the same result. Consequently
defendants structure ... comes within the terms of claim 1.. .") (emphasis added).
95 U.S. 274 (1877).
Id. at 278.
339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328 (1950).
', Id at 607.
IdI
"The Court invoked the function-way.result test of Winans and earlier cases. I& at 608
("a patentee may invoke [the doctrine of equivalents] against the producer of a device 'if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result' ) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
67 Id. at 607-08.
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"proper circumstances," such as copying with insubstantial changes,
warrant its application.
Looking at the opinion as a whole undermines this interpreta-
tion, however. After his remarks on "fraud on the patent," Justice
Jackson implied that the use of the doctrine of equivalents is not
limited to cases of piracy. Citing Westinghouse v. Boyden Power
Brake Co.," he noted that the doctrine may also work against the
patentee by preventing a finding of infringement when "a device is
so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs
the same or a similar function in a substantially different way,"
even though it falls within a literal construction of the claims."
This undermined his earlier statement that infringement begins
and ends with literal infringement." Thus, there is always a
lingering question of equivalence.
This latter nuance did not survive as well as Jackson's opening
remarks on fraud and copying. While courts did not immediately
grasp the introduction of a literal/equivalents distinction in the
Graver Tank opinion, it was inevitable that they would do so in the
future. Some seventeen years after Graver Tank, in Autogiro Co.
of America v. United States,71 the Court of Claims would clearly
demarcate separate inquiries into literal infringement and infringe-
ment by equivalents, deepening the conceptual separation intro-
duced by Graver Tank. Although the court was careful to include
equivalents analysis as a necessary step in determining infringe-
ment, 72 a new cognitive categorization was taking shape.
68 170 U.S. 537 (1898).
e' Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950).
7o One district court immediately recognized the apparent inconsistency of Jackson's
statement that literal infringement is "the end of it" and his remarks on Westinghouse v.
Boyden Power Brake. Texas Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 112 F. Supp. 455, 466, 98
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 312 (N.D. M. 1953) ("It seems to me that this statement, taken in its context,
does not have this broad meaning, as is plainly indicated by the reference to Westinghouse
v. Boyden Power Brake Co.*).
7' 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
" Id. at 400 ("If the claims do not read literally on the accused structures, infringement
is not necessarily ruled out. The doctrine of equivalents casts around a claim a penumbra
which also must be avoided if there is to be no infringement).
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C. INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The advent of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
institutionalized the literal/equivalents schism." In contrast to
the early courts, the Federal Circuit has stated that the doctrine of
equivalents is not a matter of claim interpretation because it does
not act to expand claims.74 The doctrine of equivalents increasing-
ly has been characterized as an equitable appendage75 to a more
mainstream analysis; centered around literal infringement. This
characterization has led ultimately to its marginalization. 7 Until
the last few years, however, the court has begrudgingly acknowl-
edged the need for equivalents analysis to accompany a literal
infringement analysis, as outlined in Autogiro. As a consequence,
it has retained the seeming inconsistency between the doctrines of
literal infringement and equivalence.
This inconsistency has left the court uneasy. Aided by the
doctrine's marginalized status, the court has moved to constrain the
doctrine in the name of predictability. Starting with an attempt to
limit the doctrine's application to an "all-elements" approach,77 the
"' As a measure of the institutionalization of literal infringement, consider a survey of
patent infringement cases conducted on the electronic databases Westlaw and Lexis.
Searching cases before 1945 yields 3 "hits" on the phrase "literal infringement," with no cases
referring to any two-part literal/equivalents inquiry. After 1945, there are over 500 hits,
with nearly 300 coming from the district courts after 1982, the year of the formation of the
Federal Circuit.
" Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assos., 904 F.2d 677, 684, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ('To say that the doctrine of equivalents extends or
enlarges the claims is a contradiction in terms .... The doctrine of equivalents, by
definition, involves going beyond any permissible interpretation of the claim language, Le.
it involves determining whether the accused product is "equivalent" to what is described by
the claim language").
7 See Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (using
doctrine as penumbra around bounds of claim).
7 See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (the
doctrine of equivalents is the exception, ... not the rule*); Charles Greiner & Co., Inc. v.
Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1031, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("the
doctrine retained its traditional equitable limits").
" In Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand.Waylan, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), the court
attempted to limit equivalents analysis to the finding of equivalents of "elements" in the
patent claims, as opposed to a more flexible "invention-as-a-whole" approach. While the
court has maintained the viability of the all-elements rule after Pennwalt, it has been
effectively compromised in subsequent cases, which have loosened the all-elements constraint
by enlarging the definition of an element. See, eg., Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elect
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court's efforts can be characterized as an attempt to channel
infringement analysis primarily into a test for literal infringement,
with very well-constrained forays into equivalents analysis
available only under specific and limited "equitable" threshold
conditions.
1. Particularized testimony and linking argument. Faced with
retreat on an all-elements rule,7" the quest to constrain the
doctrine of equivalents shifted ground to the question of whether
other requirements should be met before the doctrine could even be
invoked. The possibility of additional procedural and evidentiary
requirements was first raised by Judge Lourie in dictum in London
v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co.79 Plaintiff London had accused
defendant Samsonite of infringing its patent on a garment bag
hanger clamp. In reviewing the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Samsonite, Judge Lourie commented:
[a]pplication of the doctrine of equivalents is the
exception,.., not the rule, for if the public comes to
believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims
can never be relied on, and that the doctrine of
equivalents is simply the second prong of every
infringement charge, regularly available to extend
protection beyond the scope of the claims, then
claims will cease to serve their intended purpose...
The present case is one in which the claims mean
what they say.'
Applying Pennwalt, the court held that London had failed to raise
a genuine issue of material fact by not specifically showing that the
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1962 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that
"elemente in all-element rule may mean series of limitations which, taken together, make
up component of claimed invention); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d
978, 989, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that elements do not
correspond to discrete components, and that claimed and accused devices must be examined
as a whole). See also William E. Eshelman, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Post
Pennwalt Developments, 65 TUL. L REV. 883 (1991) (arguing that Federal Circuit has failed
to adhere strictly to all-elements rule in cases subsequent to Pennwalt).
7 See supra note 77.
79 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
o Id at 1538.
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accused device contained equivalents of what the court viewed as
"significant" limitations in his claims."'
A few months later, the idea of a threshold showing as a
prerequisite to the invocation of the doctrine emerged in detail. In
Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc.,'2 plaintiff Malta had
invented an improvement to musical handbells, allowing the
loudness of the bells to be modulated during performance. This
was achieved by turning the clapper of the bell into one of several
indexed positions, causing the bell to contact surfaces of varying
hardness on the clapper. Defendant Schulmerich fabricated and
sold bells with similar features, differing only in that Schulmerich
utilized felt pieces attached to the clapper instead of the "striking
buttons" claimed in Malta's patent. Malta argued that these felt
pieces were the equivalent of the striking buttons.8a
While failing to find literal infringement, the jury found infringe-
ment by the doctrine of equivalents. The trial judge granted a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Schulmerich. He cited
the Federal Circuit's holding in Lear Seigler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress
Co."4 that a plaintiff charging infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is required to present the "function/way/result"
elements of Graver Tank in the form of "particularized testimony
and linking argument."' The Federal Circuit upheld the district
court's ruling because Malta failed to present sufficiently particu-
larized evidence of equivalence between the felt surfaces and the
striking buttons." Although Malta testified that the felt surfaces
were equivalent to the buttons, his claim of infringement failed
because he did not distinctly explain why the surfaces and buttons
were equivalent.
In her dissent, Judge Newman argued that the majority's action
amounted to an improper de novo review of the evidence, and that
its requirement of particularized testimony and linking argument
strained credulity."' She argued that Malta had extensively
8 1d. at 1534.
952 F.2d 1320, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
I3 d. at 1338-39.
873 F.2d 1422, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Malta v. Schumerich Carillons, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1900, 1901 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
Malta v. Schumerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1331-1334.
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shown how the striking buttons and the felt pieces were equiva-
lent;' considering the evidence presented and the simplicity of the
invention involved, the jury clearly had an adequate basis for
determining equivalence.8 9 Sensing an attempt to constrain
Graver Tank's flexible view of equivalents, she reiterated its
statement that "proof of equivalence can be made in any form,"o
and accused the majority of a paternalistic attitude toward juries
which "diverts patent jury trials from the mainstream of the
law."91
2. Fraud or copying as a threshold requirement. Notwithstand-
ing Judge Newman's criticism, the attempt to block access to the
doctrine of equivalents has moved forward. Clearly, the court is
now looking at some kind of fraud threshold, in line with some of
Justice Jackson's statements in Graver Tank.92 The latest ques-
tions which the court has posed involve defining further equitable
requirements for pleading the doctrine, and if such requirements
are met, who will make the final determination of equivalence.
The source of the court's questions lies in Charles Greiner & Co.
v. Mari-Med Mfg.9 In Greiner, the court reviewed a district
court's finding of non-infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. The patent involved a cervical collar comprising front and
back portions of a soft material, with rigid support members at the
"bight" of each half of the collar. The accused device was quite
similar to the patented device, to the point of being marketed by
some distributors as a "generic" form of the patented collar.95 It
differed only in the construction of its rigid support members
which, while also located at the bight of the collar, extended
appreciably past either side of the bight.9M The district court
found that this extension took the accused device out of the range
of the equivalents covered by the Greiner collar, based on examina-
SId. at 1336.
s9 1& at 1342.
90 Id at 1343.
, Malta v. Schumerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
m See supra note 7.
962 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
9Id. at 1037.
"Id. at 1035.
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tion of drawings in the specification and an estoppel arising from
Greiner's admission that the rigid support members of his inven-
tion were located "only at the bight."97
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, and used
the opportunity to expound on the limits of the doctrine of equiva-
lents. Judge Rader proclaimed that, "[tihis court has repeatedly
stated that the doctrine must not clash with the legal significance
of claims .. ." and, citing Judge Lourie's comments in London,
cautioned that the doctrine be confined to its "proper equitable role"
to provide "certainty and clarity in the scope of patent rights.""
He reiterated that the doctrine of equivalents is designed solely to
prevent a "fraud on a patent," suggesting that a showing of copying
might be a threshold requirement for invoking the doctrine.
Subsequent cases have amplified this theme. InAmerican Home
Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson," Judge Plager stated that
the doctrine is available only "when necessary to protect the rights
of the patentee from fraud or other inequitable abuse," arguing
that:
the doctrine of equivalents is not an automatic
second prong to every infringement charge.... [The
patentee] must put forth proof of the equities and the
trial court must provide sufficient explication of its
reasoning to support any finding under the doctrine
of equivalents."°
Further, in Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg. Co.,10 1 the court
repeated the "fraud on the patent" language from Graver Tank,
subtly adding an additional element:
[t]he doctrine of equivalents prevents a copyist from
evading patent claims with insubstantial changes. In
Id. at 1036. This is referred to as the doctrine of "prosecution history estoppel', under
which the patentee is estopped from claiming equivalents which she gave up during
prosecution of the patent application.
" Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1031 (emphasis added).
0 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1954 (Fed. Cir. 1992).1 0 I& at 1956.
101 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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applying the doctrine, the Supreme Court refused to
allow an 'unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant
and unsubstantial changes and substitutions in the
patent.' This statement elucidates both the purpose
of the doctrine and the type of conduct which triggers
its application. 2
Not only is the doctrine of equivalents appropriate when there is
evidence of copying; such evidence may be a something extra
needed to invoke the doctrine.
In International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co.,' °8 the
court hinted at the form this something extra might take. In that
case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
alleged infringer, finding no literal infringement or infringement by
the doctrine of equivalents.' °4 The district court found a limita-
tion in the patent claims that was not present in the accused
device, thus precluding a finding of literal infringement. 0°
Conducting a "hypothetical claim" analysis under the doctrine of
equivalents, it found the accused device to be an equivalent of the
patented invention, but that infringement was precluded because
the same claim would have been obvious in the light of the prior
art.106
The reviewing panel held that the district court had improperly
granted summary judgment on literal infringement because it
erroneously read the limitation into the claim.10 7 Although the
panel upheld the district court's hypothetical claim approach, it also
concluded that the court's equivalents analysis was tainted by its
erroneous reading of the claims. 0 8 The panel remanded the case
for reconsideration of literal infringement, stating that if literal
infringement were found, application of the doctrine of equivalents
' Id. at 1043 (emphasis added).
'03 991 F.2d 768, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1588 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
'" International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (N.D.
M11. 1992).
'RoId. at 1780.
I d at 1782.
o International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 771 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
'as Id. at 772.
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would be unnecessary."°
In a lengthy concurrence, Judge Lourie argued that the panel
should have gone further in instructing the district court on the
doctrine of equivalents. Emphasizing the "fraud on the patent"
concept, he lamented that "the tripartite [Graver Tank] test has
become a mechanical formula which can often be applied to accused
infringers who are not unscrupulous copyists and who have made
more than insubstantial changes, under circumstances in which it
may not be equitable to do so. "110
In an interesting twist, Judge Lourie read the Graver Tank
statement that "equivalence is not a prisoner of formula" to mean
that in order to invoke the doctrine of equivalents, other "equitable"
factors are required beyond the "function-way-result" test. In fact,
he suggested yet another two-part test: (1) a determination of
whether the accused device meets the tripartite test, the hypotheti-
cal claims test and prosecution history estoppel, and, if it does, (2)
a separate equitable determination, including a determination of
the place of the accused device on a "copying-independent develop-
ment spectrum," and the substantiality of changes between the
accused device and the patented invention."1
D. SUMMARY: DIVISION AND DIFFERENTIATION IN DOCTRINE
This history leads to the issues presented in the Hilton Davis
case.1 12 Starting from a single idea of infringement, the courts
created a new test. The doctrine of equivalents is clearly the same
test of patent infringement found in the early cases. In contrast,
the doctrine of literal infringement arose mainly to deal with the
notice problems which exist in an ever more crowded system of
property rights. The result of this differentiation are two distinct
concepts of what constitutes a violation of those rights: infringe-
ment and equivalence.
The structure of the Patent Act supports these dual concepts.
Under the modern Act, the idea of literal infringement involves
0 International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co. Inc., 991 F.2d 768, 772 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
'
0 Id. at 774.
il Id.
'
12 See supra note 7.
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reading the section of the Act defining infringement, s in the
light of the section requiring that the specification "point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter of the invention."114  The
Autogiro court engaged in this reading.1 In the absence of such
a reading, however, "making, using or selling the patented
invention" can also support the historically more open-ended
analysis of equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents. It is this
latter interpretation of the statute which has fallen into disfavor
with the Federal Circuit.
In developing the copying model for the doctrine of equivalents,
a distinction from the early cases has metamorphosized. Cases
that preceded Graver Tank almost invariably distinguished pioneer
inventions from improvements. These cases usually involved an
inventor of an improvement seeking a judgment against a subse-
quent inventor who claimed a similar improvement to the same
machine. 6 Although it is tempting to equate copying with
equivalence under such facts, early courts generally avoided
conflating infringement with imitative activity; in fact, they
expressly carved out a distinction between conduct and result.
1 17
This distinction has gradually become blurred, particularly in the
Federal Circuit.
A potential problem with basing equivalence on a concept of
copying is that it is not clearly supported by the statute. Copying
consists of two elements: (1) the accused infringer makes, uses or
sells the invention, with (2) an intent to deceive the public and
misappropriate the original invention. The statute, however, is
", 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
114 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
1 5 Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 395-96 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
1"6 See, e.g., McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402 (1857) (distinguishing improvements to
divider, component of reaping machine).
17 See, e.g., McCormick, 61 U.S. at 402 (finding that patentee for improvement by
combining mechanical devices could not hold alleged infringer liable for using only part of
combination). In Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531 (1863), the Court distinguished between
"invasions" of a patentee's rights and "evasions" of those rights:
it has been argued, that though not a colorable invasion of the patentee's
claim, it is an evasion of his patent, which is equally injurious. If so, it
is "damnum absque injuria." Every man has a right to make an'
improvement in a machine, and evade a previous patent, provided he
does not invade the rights of the patentee.
Id. at 573-74.
[Vol 2:279300
22
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss1/8
METAPHORS
only concerned with whether the accused infringer "makes, uses or
sells" the invention.118 Prevention of copying is only incidental;
as originally formulated, the doctrine was not designed just for that
purpose. A copying-based test limits the causal aspect of the
original pioneer invention/improver distinction to a particular
species of scienter. This is not the only type of causation the
doctrine originally encompassed.
The appeal of the fraud on the patent doctrine arises from real
experience-equivalents of inventions are often obtained by
copying. Cognitively, we are likely to perceive that an object is the
equivalent of another object if we perceive spatial proximity,
temporal proximity and an intent to imitate. In other words, an
imitation serves as a prototype equivalent. However, there are
other possible prototypes.
The possibility of these other prototypes is buried in Justice
Grier's maxim: a person may not invade an invention, but they are
free to evade it.119 Apart from invasion or evasion, there is the
issue of the nature and extent of the invention. The attempt to
decouple the doctrine of equivalents from the task of claim
construction dodges this issue. Despite assertions that claims do
not embrace equivalents of inventions, they do signify them.
Claims point out equivalents, too; in this sense, are not equivalents
the same as the invention?
Part II deals with inventions, equivalence and infringement
starting from this cognitive question. Borrowing from theories of
cognitive linguistics, it explains the interaction between infringe-
ment and equivalence as an interaction of metaphors of inventions.
These metaphors often produce consistent results; when they do,
courts have little difficulty in determining the proper scope of a
patent. When they do not, a conceptual crisis ensues.
II. INFRINGEMENT AS A COGNrIIVE ISSUE
In Winans v. Denmead ... the Supreme Court,
apparently for the first time, laid down the doctrine
over a strong dissent, and based it upon the theory
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
119 See supra note 117.
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that the claim was not intended to be verbally
definitive, but to cover the "invention" which should,
to some extent anyway, be gathered from the disclo-
sure at large ... It is plain that such latitude
violates in theory the underlying and necessary
principle that the disclosure is open to the public
save as the claim forbids, and that it is the claim and
that alone which measures the monopoly... On the
one hand, therefore, the claim is not to be taken at
its face - however freely construed - but its element
may be treated as example of a class which may be
extended more [or] less broadly as the disclosure
warrants, the prior art permits, and originality of the
discovery makes desirable. On the other, it is not to
be ignored as a guide in ascertaining those elements
of the disclosure which constitute the "invention" and
without which there would be no patent at all.'
As Judge Hand points out, the courts' handling of patent claims
is arguably inconsistent. On one hand, the doctrine of literal
infringement embodies a perspective that claims define the
periphery of a fixed object, the boundary of the patent property. On
the other hand, the doctrine of equivalents implies that claims also
point to a discovery which transcends these literal boundaries, but
which is also the claimed invention.
The usual response to this clash is in terms of balancing between
two interests. The first interest is that claims "point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter"121 of the invention, which
provides order and predictability. This interest is weighed against
the interest in fully preserving a patentee's rights against another
who "makes, uses or sells the invention,"12 which preserves the
incentives underlying the patent system. While this balancing
metaphor has a certain appeal, its fairly difficult in practice.
Exactly what does one balance? The proposed equation seems as
' Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Matchlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 575-76 (2d Cir. 1929).
121 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
'n 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
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intractable as Judge Hand's "B < PL" formulation for tort liabili-
ty.123 In spite of protests about balance, one suspects that in a
contest between competing interests, a court simply chooses one
over the other.
This decision occurs because the determination of patent
infringement is a task of categorization. Courts trying patent cases
struggle to see how linguistic entities - claims - look like physical
objects and motions.12' An important aspect of this activity is
that it is motivated. Theories like literal infringement and the
doctrine of equivalents are metaphorical tools which allow the court
to categorize perceptual data as it decides whether to bring the
coercive power granted it under the patent laws. This section looks
at these tools in greater depth.
A. A THEORY OF METAPHOR
The working hypothesis of cognitive linguistics, in its "experienti-
alist" form, is that all human cognition, including language, is
pervasively metaphorical."2 Far from being found only in poetry,
metaphors are our everyday tools of analogical reasoning. 126
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Of course, Judge
Hand recognized the impossibility of applying a quantitative test to such incommensurable
factors. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1949).
' In fact, Justice Holmes once referred to the "felt meaning" of a claim. United States
v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496 (1911).
' "Experientialism" is a term attributable to the linguist.philosophers George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); G.
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1987). Experientialism starts with the
hypothesis that human thought and action is fundamentally shaped by the linguistic
function. Specifically, it posits that thought and action are pervasively influenced by
metaphor, the cognitive mapping between various domains of human experience. MARK
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON METAPHOR 3-47 (Mark Johnson, ed. 1981).
The role of metaphor in legal discourse has been analyzed in the domain of constitutional
law. See, eg., Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1988); Steven L Winter, Indeterminacy
and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990). Winter's work
picks up on that of Felix Cohen and Robert Cover, and the earlier work of legal realists such
as Llewellyn, Corbin, and Frank.
' Lakoff and Johnson point out:
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination ... a
matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover,
metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a
matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most
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Metaphor is the means by which we create categories, which are
indispensable to our everyday interaction with the world.' As
we daily encounter new domains of experience, we act in this new
domain through metaphorical projection of certain gestalts we have
already constructed through our experience as physical and cultural
beings.12 As the predictive power of the metaphor is reinforced
by experience in the new domain, the imaginative quality of a given
metaphor is gradually submerged. It ceases to appear metaphorical
and becomes a part of ordinary language. We begin to act as we
talk.129
Metaphorical projection generates entailments, in which related
structural metaphors from a source domain are carried into a
target domain. This projection is partial, however, because only
those parts of the source experiential gestalt that seem to be of use
people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We
have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life,
not just in language but in thought and action.
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 3.
' For example, consider waking up in the morning- you get up out of a bed (category
things to sleep on), go through the bedroom door (category things to pass through) and into
the kitchen (category places to eat in).
12 This is the motivated aspect of metaphor:
Because so many of the concepts that important to us are either abstract
or not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, time, etc.), we
need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we
understand in clearer terms (spatial orientations, objects, etc.). This
need leads to metaphorical definition in our conceptual system.
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 115.
Lakoff and Johnson offer the metaphor ARGUMENT AS WAR as an example:
It is important to see that we don't just talk about arguments in terms
of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we
are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and defend our
own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find
a position indefensible, we can abandon it an take a new line of attack.
Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the
concept of war .... The essence of metaphor is understanding and
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. It is not that
arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different
kinds of things, ... and the actions performed are different kinds of
actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed
and talked about in terms of WAR .... this is the ordinary way of having
an argument and talking about one.
LAKOFF AND JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 4-5. See also JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 15-16
("the 'fixed truths' of our culture are nothing but metaphorical understandings that have
been conventionalized to the point where their metaphoricity is forgotten').
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in the target domain are projected. Entailments from the source
domain which do not work in the target domain are perceived as
figurative, and considered outside the ordinary language employed
in the target domain.3 0
Hence, metaphors are incapable of exhaustively describing the
phenomena we experience. Under a classical objectivist theory of
meaning, categories are defined by inherent properties. Under an
experientialist theory of meaning, however, the metaphor-created
categories have interactional properties; meanings are provisional
according to the environment in which the imperfect metaphors are
used. 131 This undermines the proposition that any categorization
is capable of converging upon a single objective formulation. In
place of a God's eye view, we have a plethora of models, each
revealing certain truths about experience while concealing others.
1 oLakoff and Johnson give the example of the metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS:
The parts of the concept BUILDING that are used to structure the
concept THEORY are the foundation and the outer shell. The roof,
staircases, and hallways are parts of a buildings which are not used as
part of the concept THEORY. Thus the metaphor THEORIES ARE
BUILDINGS has a 'used* part (foundation and outer shell) and an
Ounused" part (rooms, staircases, etc.). Expressions such as construct and
foundation are instances of the used part of such a metaphorical concept
and are part of our ordinary literal language about theories.
LAKOFF AND JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 52-53.
"
8 As an example, consider the metaphors LIGHT IS WAVES and LIGHT IS PARTICLES
which are employed in physics. Neither particles nor waves appear to have an objective
correlation to some object "light in the world. The two metaphors are obviously inconsis-
tent, yet both are accepted by physicists and engineers because they both are useful in
explaining, and more importantly, predicting certain experiences. LIGHT IS WAVES is
useful for determining the makeup of a star or for designing a telescope to view one.
Similarly, LIGHT IS PARTICLES is useful in designing a television camera to record the
image. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 165.
Lakoff gives a concrete example of this "motivated situatedness" through case studies of
the language of the Australian aboriginal Dyirbal tribe. In this language, the world is
divided up into four basic categories which would seem strange to non-aborigines; for
instance, one category includes women, fire, bandicoots, and poisonous species of snakes.
Lakoff hypothesizes that these categories roughly correspond to a Dyirbal tribesman's basic
experiential gestalts; for example, the category recited roughly (but not quite) corresponds
to "dangerous things.' Part of the evidence supporting Lakofi's hypothesis is that the
Dyirbal system of classification appears to be breaking down over successive generations as
the tribe has been exposed to Western culture. See LAKOFF, supra note 125, at 92-102.
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B. METAPHOR IN INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE
The history of infringement doctrine reveals a problem of
categorization. Our inability to formulate a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions to define inventions is reflected in the fact that
two of our major metaphors of invention, INVENTIONS ARE
OBJECTS and INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES, are essentially
incomplete and inconsistent. This section's working hypothesis is
that INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS is the main source of concepts
like claims measure the invention and literal infringement, while
the metaphor INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES is the main
source of concepts like pioneer inventions and the doctrine of
equivalents. The inconsistencies between these metaphors partially
explain the dissonance in doctrine, while the ascendancy of certain
entailments of each helps explain decisions in particular cases or
particular eras.
1. Inventions are objects. The metaphor INVENTIONS ARE
OBJECTS is largely spatial, motivated by a need to administer
relationships between people. A convenient way of administering
these relationships is to divide the world into discrete objects, and
give individuals possession of these objects. Such division allows
people to trade these objects between themselves to acquire the
various objects they desire. In manipulating these objects, it is
useful to define them in terms of boundaries which enclose spaces.
A person's rights in an object are violated when another touches or
penetrates those boundaries. Entailments for INVENTIONS ARE
OBJECTS might include: (1) INVENTIONS CAN BE POS-
SESSED; (2) INVENTIONS CAN BE TRANSFERRED; (3)
INVENTIONS HAVE BOUNDARIES, INSIDES AND OUTSIDES,
MEASURABLE EXTENT, AND ELEMENTS; (4) INVENTIONS
CAN BE PENETRATED; AND (5) INVENTIONS CAN BE
COPIED.
These entailments are found in the Constitution, the patent
statute and case law. The Constitution seeks to secure for the
inventor the "exclusive Right. " 3 2 The patent statute allows for
ownership and assignment of an invention;'38 it also requires an
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. .35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
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invention to be pointed out and distinctly claimed.1 ' Many cases
speak of scope, breadth and coverage, and of expanding and
limiting claims.'3 The concept that inventions have elements is
also widespread.""
Finally, there is the concept of infringement itself. One
definition for "infringe" is "to break in or encroach on or upon."13 7
Its use in the context of patents suggests that claims define a
space, and that violation of that space occurs when someone
encroaches on boundaries defined by claims. Starting with the
early cases, which speak of the invasion of the patent right,"3
cases in the mid-nineteenth century begin to speak interchangeably
of the invasion of the patent."9 In ordinary discourse, the patent
becomes a bounded object subject to touches or penetrations by
infringers.
The INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS metaphor is critical to the
idea of infringement. In a culture which places great importance
on the possession and exchange of objects, a model which places
innovation in discrete packages is very useful. It enables inven-
tions to be possessed, and it creates markets. Through concepts
like scope, elements and infringement, INVENTIONS ARE
OBJECTS provides a powerful analytical tool for courts deciding
the extent of these packages and how people interact with them.
2. Inventions are discoveries. The metaphor INVENTIONS ARE
DISCOVERIES is both spatial and temporal. A discoverer is
13 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
' See, eg., Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. 74, 84 (1854) (scope of the patentee's invention');
The Driven-Well Cases, 122 U.S. 40, 59 (1887) ("enlarge the scope of the claim so as to
cover"); Yale Lock v. Greenleaf, 117 U.S. 554, 558-59 (1886) (The scope of letters patent
must be limited to the invention covered by the claim').
1w See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (1987) (holding
there was no infringement); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 224 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 526 (1985) (holding that plaintiff failed to prove infringement).
u' THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1070 (3d ed. 1973).
*' See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 454, 496 (1818) (holding that patent
conveyed only an exclusive right to improvement); Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914,922 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047).
' See, e.g., McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 405 (1857); Cawood Patent, 94 U.S. 695,
710 (1876); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 147 (1888). Then there is Justice Jackson's
statement in Graver Tank that ][ilf accused matter falls clearly within the claim,
infringement is made out .... " Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S.
605, 607 (1950) (holding that finding of infringement by defendant's device under doctrine
of equivalents was not clearly erroneous).
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someone who finds some previously unknown place. As later
explorers define its contours, this place often turns out to be more
extensive than the discoverer's initial contemplation. The discover-
er is entitled to a share of this reward because the temporal
concept of causation tells us that without the initial discovery,
there would be no later explorers. Entailments for INVENTIONS
ARE DISCOVERIES might include: (1) INVENTORS FIND
UNKNOWN PRINCIPLES; (2) INVENTORS ARE PIONEERS; (3)
PIONEER INVENTIONS HAVE ILL-DEFINED BOUNDARIES;
AND (4) INVENTORS OWN WHAT THEY FIND AND OWNER-
SHIP OF INVENTIONS CAUSES FURTHER INVENTION.
INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES is found in the Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discover-ies.140
Also here are the entailments that securing ownership in discover-
ies provides an incentive to further discovery, thus furthering the
public good.
These entailments are also at work in the cases, particularly in
the concept of a pioneer invention. In Reutgen v. Kanowrs, the
inventor of a machine for making iron bolts sued a former employee
who had invented a putative improvement to the original ma-
chine. 41 The original inventor created his machine by modifying
yet another machine, a common tilt.'42 The defendant's machine
was similar, except it also included "swedges." An intriguing aspect
of the case is the way Judge Washington characterized the
patented invention and the accused device. He referred to the
plaintiffs machine as the "discovery" or the "original invention,"
while referring to the defendant's machine as an "improve-
,oU.S. CONSr. art. I, § S, cl. 8.
1 Ruetgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710).
A common tilt is a heavy powered hammer/anvil combination used in forging. The
invention consisted of providing the hammer and anvil with concave surfaces, moved by a
cogwheel powered by water or the like. Id. at 555-56.
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ment."1  The inventor of the original machine is entitled to the
"principal" of the machine. The accused escapes liability for
infringement only if his machine represents an improvement on the
plaintiff's principle, as opposed to an improvement on the principal
of the tilt.'" Clearly, this characterization is essential to the
interpretation of the patentee's claims.
In Odiorne v. Winkley, Justice Story invokes this same distinc-
tion:
suppose a watch was first invented by a person so as
to mark the hours only, and another person added
the work to mark the minutes, and a third the
seconds; each of them using the same combinations
and mode of operations, to mark the hours, as the
first. In such a case, the inventor of the second-hand
could not have entitled himself to a patent embracing
the inventions of the other parties."
The inventor of the original watch would have rights enforceable
against the others because he got "there" first. Even though he has
invented an arguably worthless invention-a watch with no minute
or second hands-the others cannot produce their watches without
his permission, as long as we perceive that his watch was the
original invention.
Finally, in Gray v. James, Judge Washington responds to a
defendant's arguments that a patentee's machine was not useful or,
more specifically, was not an invention, by pointing out that:
[I]f the machine be useless, it may fairly be asked,
why do they use it? If they give the answer.., this
it was used with improvements which make it
valuable, may it not be replied, that this proves that
the original invention was useful? For, if that had
not been made by some person, it is obvious that the
improvements could have not been made. If [the
1 Id. at 556.
1
"Id. at 556.
14 Odiorne v. Winldey, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
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plaintiffl... had not made the discovery which he
did, can any person doubt that the present improved
and valuable [machinery] would be unknown in the
world?'"
At work here is a concept that certain inventors are entitled to
a quantum of ownership simply because they get to a certain place
first; "W[the inventor of the original machine... may lawfully enjoy
the full benefit of that discovery, notwithstanding the improvement
made upon it by a subsequent discoverer."1 47 In the domain of
discoveries such a place might be a continent, while in the domain
of inventions, it is the principle or substance. This is an entailment
of INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES; inventions are analogous to
particular objects or locations which have particular tem-
poral/causal relationships.
The later doctrine of equivalents cases reiterate this theme. For
instance, in McCormick v. Talcott a key issue was whether the
patentee discovered the underlying principle of the divider:
If [the plaintiffi be the original inventor of the device
or machine called the divider, he will have a right to
treat as infringers all who make dividers operating
on the same principle, and performing the same
functions by analogous means or equivalent combina-
tions, even though the infringing machine may be an
improvement of the original, and patentable as such.
But if the invention claimed be itself an improve-
ment on a known machine by a mere change of form
or combination of parts, the patentee cannot treat
another as an infringer who has improved the
original machine by use of a different form or combi-
nation performing the same functions. The inventor
of the first improvement cannot invoke the doctrine
of equivalents to suppress other improvements which
are not mere colorable invasions of the first.148
'"Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1018 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718) (emphasis added).
1 Evans v. Hettick, 8 F. Cas. 861, 867 (E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 4,562) (emphasis added).
"
8 McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 405 (1857).
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In the domain of discovery, this is analogous to a comparison of
Columbus's discovery of America to DeSoto's discovery of the
Mississippi River and Balboa's discovery of the Pacific. De Soto
and Balboa both owe a debt to Columbus because without him, both
would still be in Spain. However, Balboa and de Soto owe nothing
to each other. For our inventors, if McCormick is the discoverer of
the place identified as the divider, Talcott owes him a debt even if
he is exploring hitherto unexplored frontiers of that place. If
McCormick is himself just an explorer of the divider, however,
Talcott would not be an infringer unless his device is essentially
identical to McCormick's.
Exploring the metaphor, although Columbus discovers America,
the only concrete terms in which he can describe it refer to the
much narrower domain of Hispaniola. He writes to Isabella and
Ferdinand, describing the natives, the palm trees and the coconuts,
and asks to be named governor. De Soto comes along, explores
North America from Georgia to the Mississippi. Yet, because of the
perceived spatial and temporal/causal relationship between the two,
we somehow feel comfortable with the notion of giving a right in all
of America to Columbus and not to de Soto; Columbus's discovery
is somehow worth more than de Soto's. If we did not recognize this
greater worth, the incentive for people to act like Columbus would
be diminished. We read Columbus' claim to cover de Soto's, even
though he did not literally discover Georgia or the Mississippi
River.
Under the doctrine of equivalents, we similarly are comfortable
reading McCormick's claims to include Talcott's divider, if we can
think of McCormick as the original or pioneer inventor. This is
because experience tells us that when one first discovers a princi-
ple, one cannot imagine its possible extent. The fact that the
boundaries of a pioneer invention cannot be clearly defined should
not preclude the pioneer inventor from having a right even in that
part of the place which he was unable to claim. His invention is
worth more because he found it first, which allowed others to
follow. The incentive to discover new principles would be dimin-
ished if we acted otherwise. This is an effect of the spatial and
temporal entailments of the metaphor INVENTIONS ARE
DISCOVERIES. We define the extent of an invention in terms of
a temporal relationship between inventors.
1994]
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The INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES metaphor is useful in
explaining experiences about which the INVENTIONS ARE
OBJECTS metaphor is silent. It embraces the commonly held
perception that someone who finds something first owns it as
against subsequent explorers because the initial discovery paves
the way for them. This notion is manifest in the idea that a
pioneer inventor finds an abstract place, a general principle which
transcends the literal limits of claims.
C. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE METAPHORS
At times, INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES is consistent with
INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS, while at other times the metaphors
collide. For instance, INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES relies on
the object aspect of INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS; an inventor
finds a thing, a principle. In contrast, collision occurs because
INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES entailments such as PIO-
NEERS ARE SUPERIOR TO IMPROVERS AND INVENTIONS
DON'T HAVE WELL-DEFINED BOUNDARIES do not mesh well
with the spatial entailments of INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS.
Alone, the recognition of this effect is no great revelation-it is
the familiar tension between order and equity noted by many
commentators. 149 The interesting thing to note is that although
this tension is often recognized, decisions rest on the ascendancy of
one or the other metaphor. Why is this? Though many commenta-
tors discuss balancing interests in the process of "defining the
scope" of the patent grant, courts really do not do that. They
simply decide whether or not an accused device infringes.
In cases where the court clearly perceives the patented invention
as a pioneer, the INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES metaphor
dominates. For example, in Hughes Aircraft v. United States,W°
the court focused on how the patentee of a new type of satellite
altitude control system solved a technical problem which huge
government expenditures had been unable to solve.'51 While not
quite of the stature as the first spin-stabilized satellite, the court
a See supra note 6.
uo 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
-uId. at 1351.
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considered the patented invention to be a sort of pioneer. Thus, he
was entitled to a range of equivalents broader than "that very
narrow range of equivalents applicable to improvement patents in
a crowded art.152
However, the court did not describe exactly the range nor how far
inside the range the accused device penetrated - it would be
difficult if not impossible to do so. MEASURING DISTANCE
FROM A BOUNDARY is an entailment of the INVENTIONS ARE
OBJECTS metaphor which is not useful within the experience of
invention. What dominates is the temporal relationship between
the patent and the accused devices. The OBJECTS entailments of
boundaries and elements are barely mentioned. The court applied
an "invention as a whole" approach to the "function-way-result" test
and the patentee won, even though the accused satellites were
arguably different from the patented invention.
In contrast, INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS dominates in cases
where the court is convinced that an invention is not a pioneer.
For example, the majority opinion in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-
Wayland, Inc. denied pioneer status for the plaintiff's patent."
This rejection revealed the underlying weakness of the INVEN-
TIONS ARE DISCOVERIES metaphor in the case, leaving the field
open to INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS. Declaring that claims
strictly define the measure of a patent, the court turned an
obligatory doctrine of equivalents inquiry into a redundant literal
infringement test by adopting the "all elements" rule.'"
However, the court could not define the boundaries of the claims
any better than it could in Hughes Aircraft; that entailment of the
INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS is still too metaphorical. The court
found a literal detail in the patent which it could not find in the
accused device," and the patentee lost. INVENTIONS ARE
DISCOVERIES is still powerful in the dissent because the dissent
envisioned the case as being more like Hughes Aircraft."
0Id at 1361.833 F.2d 981, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
'Id. at 938.
Note that in dissent, Judge Bennett quite easily finds an equivalent of the limitation
on which the majority hangs its decision. Id. at 944.
' Id. at 941-42.
1994] 313
35
Meeks: Metaphors of Infringement and Equivalence: The Solution of Our Pr
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
Even an enigmatic case like Texas Instruments v. United States
International Trade Commission1 5 7 can be explained in terms of
these metaphors. The court considered a possible infringement of
the first patent on the electronic hand-held calculator by several
imported calculators which employed state of the art technolo-
gy." The claims of the patent were written in very broad
"means-plus-function" terms,5 9 which made it difficult to avoid
a finding of literal infringement. In such a situation, INVEN-
TIONS ARE OBJECTS should carry the day and produce a finding
of infringement.
But INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES also had great force
because the invention was clearly pioneering. Texas Instruments
discovered the calculator, but allowing the literal scope of Texas
Instruments' claims to prevail would be the cognitive equivalent to
saying Columbus discovered Alaska because Alaska is now part of
America. The temporal relationship was too remote to allow
INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS to dominate. Thus, the court
applied the reverse doctrine of equivalents.le INVENTIONS
ARE DISCOVERIES prevails, and the court barely mentioned
boundaries and notice.
Thus, a court usually reads a claim as pointing to or describing
different inventions, depending on whether it perceives the
invention as more like an OBJECT or more like a DISCOVERY.
Generally, if the invention looks like a discovery, then the claims
refer to the principle of the invention-the place-and the court
ignores boundaries and notice. If the invention looks more like an
OBJECT, the court dissects the claims, makes statements like
"claims measure the grant," and emphasizes that failure to keep to
"7 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1561-62.
The claim included an "input means," "electronic means for performing arithmetic
computations," "memory means," and "display means." Id. at 1561. However, the patent
came early in the first generation of such devices, and the specification described preferred
embodiments using first-generation technology such as bipolar junction transistors and
thermal printers. Id at 1566-67.
160 The reverse doctrine of equivalents holds that accused devices do not infringe a patent
because of the stretch of time and intervening events between the issuance of the patent and
the alleged infringement. Id at 1558.
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the literal meaning of the claims has implications for due process
and the integrity of the patent system.61
D. OTHER POSSIBLE METAPHORS
The INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES and INVENTIONS ARE
OBJECTS are only two of many possible metaphoric projections
capable of producing the phenomena observed in patent cases. If
one accepts the theory of metaphor, there is conceivably an infinite
variety of metaphorical projections which may be at work in a given
culture, with different metaphors predominating in particular
contexts. Talking about a few simply opens up the possibility of
finding others. At best, it provides yet another handle on the
amorphous problem that Judge Hand referred to in Claude Neon
Lights.16
2
One important thing to keep in mind-assuming one accepts the
explanatory power of experientialism-is that these metaphors may
not continue to be as dominant as they have been in the past.
Dominant metaphors in patent law will change as the technologi-
cal, economic and legal environment changes. Some of these
changes will be the result of experiences which are more physical
in character, while others will be of a more cultural nature." All
will be subject to a certain inertia.16 ' As for the current trend of
" Cases like Texas Instruments v. United States Intl Trade Comm'n reinforce this
hypothesis. There, the claim was overly broad, possibly due to unconscious assumptions
about the pace of technological development in the field. Even though the claim was too
broad, the court could not declare it invalid based on a lack of novelty or obviousness; thus,
it was stuck with a finding of literal infringement unless it could find a way to modify the
literal meaning of the claims, which is did through the doctrine of equivalents. Texas
Instruments v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
'62 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
1
' In experientialist terms, 'physical' does not mean more basic or real. An example of
an experiential input which is more physical in nature is the perceived effect on our bodies
of what we call gravity - it pushes us down. In the context of patent law, physical experience
might change through developments in the basic sciences such as genetics or particle physics,
i.e., through fundamental changes in our abilities to interact with a physical environment.
Changes in experience which are more 'cultural" might include changes in economic or
political organization. It is important to realize, however, that these experiences are often
interrelated. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 125.
1" Steven Winter discusses the phenomenon of inertia or 'sedimentation' in the context
of the emergence of "new* constitutional rights, such as privacy. See Steven Winter,
Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL L. REV. 1441 (1990).
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the Federal Circuit, it can be explained in terms of the ascendancy
of the INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS metaphor, which appears to
be at work in the copying limitation on the use of the doctrine of
equivalents.
One suspects that the dominance of this metaphor may be linked
to a controlling perception that technological development is
increasingly a battle between intense competitors fighting at the
margins of modestly inventive, but extremely valuable inventions
in a crowded art.'" In such an environment, inventions are
complex and close together. The ELEMENTS and BOUNDARIES
entailments of INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS are useful tools in
dealing with this complexity. A COPYING entailment is similarly
useful because it limits a broad inquiry into temporal/causal
relationships between a patented invention and an accused device
to an ostensibly simpler inquiry into the conduct of the accused
infringer. However, these tools face some of the same serious
obstacles in the INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES metaphor and
the patent statute itself.1
The conclusion of this Note discusses the implications of the
ascendancy of the INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS metaphor,
specifically in the context of the issues the Federal Circuit has
raised about the doctrine of equivalents. It also suggests some
ways in which an analysis of the cognitive bases of infringement
doctrine might support some alternative paths the court appears to
be taking. These alternatives are linked to the competing meta-
phor INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES, which captures the
diversity-building incentives underlying intellectual property laws.
'" For instance, when an electronics firm develops a new microprocessor, the develop-
ment takes many years and several millions of dollars. However, it is not perceived as a
spectacular breakthrough in comparison to the initial discovery of the transistor or the
integrated circuit, even though probably as much or more time and effort is expended
developing the microprocessor as was spent on the initial research on the transistor. One
factor in our perception of the inventiveness of a particular invention is the perceived
frequency of similar inventions. For instance, with the development of computer design,
simulation and test, electronics inventions have become almost commonplace. See, e.g., Mark
J. Rozman, Recent Development, Intel v. ULSI System Technology, Inc., I J. INTELL PROP.
L. 373, 390-93 (1994) (discussing background of microprocessor industry).16 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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III. CONCLUSION
[T]he chemical metaphor is both beautiful and
insightful. It gives us a view of problems as things
that never disappear utterly and that cannot be
solved once and for all. All of your problems are
always present, only they may be dissolved and in
solution, or they may be in solid form. The best you
can hope for is to find a catalyst that will make one
problem dissolve without making another one precip-
itate out. And since you do not have complete
control over what goes into solution, you are con-
stantly finding old and new problems precipitating
out and present problems dissolving, partly because
of your efforts and partly despite anything you
do. 16
7
A. THE NEED FOR DIVERSE METAPHORS
The crisis presented by the doctrine of equivalents is not all that
unusual. It is an example of what Thomas Kuhn refers to as a
"crisis of normal science," the inevitable failure of models to
completely describe a given set of phenomena.' For patent law,
the infringement/equivalence controversy is a similar anomaly, one
for which there will not be a complete solution.
However, the idea that a particular model or set of rules will
solve the problem is seductive. Models-metaphors-provide a
means to predict, giving a basis for expectation and action. But, as
Lakoff and Johnson point out:
16 7 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 143-144 (1980).
10 THoMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66-76 (2d ed. 1970).
In theoretical physics, for example, such a crisis developed around the Bohr model of
atomic interaction. A miniature solar system held together by deterministic forces was a
powerful model, but eventually it just did not cohere with certain experimental observations.
De Broglie's introduction of electron wave theory helped explain some of these phenomena,
but neither wave theory nor particle theory give a complete account of all phenomena. P.
TIPLER, PHYSICS 968 (1976).
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it is one thing to impose a single objectivist model in
some restricted situations and to function in terms of
that model - perhaps successfully; it is another to
conclude that the model is an accurate reflection of
reality. There is a good reason why our conceptual
systems have inconsistent metaphors for a single
concept. The reason is that there is no one metaphor
that will do.16
If the Federal Circuit thinks it can eliminate uncertainty in
infringement cases by confining courts to the literal interpretation
of claims, with a limited exception for copying, it is likely to be as
unsuccessful in this effort as it was in keeping to the "all-elements"
rule of Pennwalt." As the chemical metaphor suggests, new
problems will precipitate out.
Departing from the chemical metaphor, the fate of doctrine of the
equivalents raises ecological issues. The effects of the Federal
Circuit's decisions will be distributed throughout the technological
community, in ways which are at best only dimly perceived. In
keeping with the ecology metaphor, the question may be whether
the court's doctrinal moves reach an ecological dead end.
By emphasizing the INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS metaphor for
the sake of uniformity, the court risks ignoring other metaphors
which offer equally useful insights into the development of
technology. For example, INVENTIONS ARE OBJECTS has little
to say about incentives for pioneering achievements, or about the
collaborative aspects of innovation which have been of critical
importance in the development of many new technologies.
Uniformity at the cost of these values may not be worth the cost.
As an alternative to arguments for uniformity, we might look at
these issues using the metaphor DIVERSITY IS A SURVIVAL
VALUE, an entailment of our ecology metaphor that shares much
with INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES. Our experience of
ecosystems is that once the diversity of a stable ecosystem is
reduced, that ecosystem's robustness may be diminished, rendering
the remaining species vulnerable to destruction from environmental
1 6 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 220-21.
'
70 See supra note 77.
318 [Vol 2:279
40
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss1/8
METAPHORS
changes. Examining the incentives embodied in the INVENTIONS
ARE DISCOVERIES metaphor, we can see that patents help
encourage efforts in unconventional directions, protecting them
from the crush of the status quo and ensuring technological
diversity."' 1 This is one aspect of the patent system which we
risk losing with the ascendancy of the INVENTIONS ARE OB-
JECTS metaphor.
B. ANSWERING THE COURT'S QUESTIONS
Judge Lourie's comment that application of the doctrine of
equivalents is becoming habitual and mechanical may be cor-
rect;1 7 2 the "function-way-result" standard seems very malleable.
A question which the court has avoided, however, is whether this
truly is a problem. If it is, there is good reason to suspect that it
is overblown, as technological development in the United States has
managed to proceed quite well under traditional practices.
The myth is that courts do not already engage in a well-con-
strained inquiry into infringement. Under the current two-part
test, a literal reading of claims should normally prevail as long as
our system of invention disclosure remains cognitively adequate.
If the system is adequate, the doctrine of equivalents should receive
cursory treatment in most cases. Claiming practice is highly
conventionalized, and most fact finders will be persuaded by a
given literal interpretation of a claim. In addition, factors such as
the prosecution history estoppel and the hypothetical claims
analysis tend to diminish the probability of juries and judges
running amok.
17 This incentive even works toward the recognition of serendipitous accidents requiring
very little investment. The point is that patents help create the consciousness that any new
interpretation of experience may be potentially useful. This value in diversity should be
distinguished from the idea of aggregate economic efficiency, with which it does not exactly
coincide. Patent laws do not exist to provide fixed expectancies for investors; to the contrary,
they exist in part to encourage people to pursue activities which often make little economic
sense, at least in a prospective sense. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard
of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, (1992) (arguing that purpose of nonobviousness
standard, including protection for beth methodical and serendipitous invention, is to
encourage research which is highly uncertain).1
" See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Given this, worrying that the doctrine of equivalents might
become the rule instead of the exception misses the point. The
doctrine of equivalents serves as a monitor of the health of our
system of invention disclosure. If we have a predominance of
findings of infringement by equivalents, we should worry more
about the viability of this system. An explosion of findings of
infringement by equivalents would tend to indicate that our
methods of disclosure are inadequate for making new technologies
patentable, and that we may be losing the ability to talk to each
other about inventions. 7 A more sensible response to this
problem may be to seek improvement of the mode of disclosure,
instead of doing away with a doctrine which compensates for its
inadequacies.
These inadequacies can cut both ways. A patentee can claim
either too little or too much. 74 Generally, interpreting claims
involves the difficult but unavoidable task of assigning a substan-
tive value to inventions. Merges and Nelson point out that the
doctrine of equivalents and its reverse provide a means for courts
to adjust patent scope, based on an ex post facto analysis of the
patent in the context of its economic and technological environ-
ment. 7 ' This is an effect of the temporal/causal entailments of
the INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES metaphor discussed herein.
It guarantees that the scope of patents will always in some sense
be uncertain.
The proposed copying approach attempts to avoid this uncertain-
ty by adopting a limited contract view of the patent process, a view
consistent with the dominance of the INVENTIONS ARE OB-
JECTS metaphor. Under this metaphor, temporal/causal relation-
ships are limited to those normally associated with objects;
someone touches your object or copies it. The copying paradigm
"
7 As media for expression become more varied, one wonders if written specifications and
claims are anachronistic. The way claims are written now renders them almost useless;
Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit seems to think they are. See An Interview with Circuit
Judge S. Jay Plager, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Dec. 1993, at 2 ("I no longer think the claims I
read are going to toll me what I need to know-even aside from having to look at the
specification and file history").174 See supra notes 150, 157 and accompanying text.
'
75 See Robert P. Merges and Richard P. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908-16 (1990) (discussing economics of patent scope as
affected by courts' discretion in patent law).
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views these as the only types of events which justify modifying the
contract. Given the intrinsically uncertain scope of patents, it is a
dubious enterprise to view patent prosecution in terms of a contract
model because both parties are negotiating without any basis for
expectation. But even contract theory recognizes other events
which serve to undermine the original intent of the parties, such as
mistake and changed circumstances. 78
The requirement that an argument for infringement by equiva-
lents be accompanied by particularized testimony and linking
argument might help broaden a fact finder's cognitive experience,
but one suspects that it is much like the "function-way-result" test,
a mere statement of the problem. It is difficult to say what the
standard means, and in many cases its assertion is pointless, if not
harmful. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could convince a fact
finder that an accused device is an infringing equivalent without
offering some kind of evidence and argument as to how it is
equivalent, especially when an opposing party is arguing vehement-
ly that it is not. When considering more complex rules of pleading
and production, perhaps the Federal Circuit should temper its
sense of mission with the realization that the adversary system and
the common sense ofjudges and juries can adequately resolve many
cases.
Admittedly, this becomes problematic in technically complex
cases. While the division of labor in our modem society makes
possible many of our complex technological achievements, it also
makes it difficult to empanel a jury or judge with sufficient
experience to be sensitive to many of the nuances of specialized
technical issues. In such cases it is tempting to argue for special-
"' The same goes for advice given by patent attorneys. One of the chief complaints about
the doctrine of equivalents is that is makes it difficult for patent attorneys to advise their
clients. See aupra note 12.
Presumably, a competent attorney relies on more than a literal interpretation of a patent
document when giving advice. In addition to being familiar with the documents, he also is
knowledgeable enough about the technology to have at least an educated "feel for what
might be argued to be an equivalent, and how to respond to such arguments. While no one
would quarrel with eliminating as much arbitrariness from the law as is possible-that is
what due process is all about-the patent laws do not exist to make life easier for patent
attorneys.
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ized tribunals with ever more complex rules of procedure. 77
However, we expose ourselves to danger if we abdicate the
determination of such issues to those whose experience is limited
to parochial, conventionalized notions of law and technology.
Moreover, technically complex cases are not all that the patent laws
must accommodate; technically complex procedures presuppose
technically complex cases. We should keep in mind that a patent
system which accommodates diversity may be more robust.
Judge Lourie's equitable threshold idea may be even more
dangerous. Many current cases fit the situation which gives rise to
Judge Lourie's copying test. However, conventionalizing this into
new burdens of proof and persuasion is ill-advised because the
inertia of these new rules unnecessarily constrains courts in future
cases. No one can offer any prediction as to what degree of
economy or certainty will be gained by raising a barrier to the
application of the doctrine." 8 Its practical effect may be to shift
the uncertainty and inefficiency attributed to the doctrine of
equivalents to the issue of whether the equitable threshold has
been met.17
9
The search for an alternative to the function-way-result test of
Graver Tank is ironic because it is only a label for the amorphous
cluster of meaning we call equivalence or infringement.W0 Equiv-
1?? See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1989) (reciting arguments for specialized "science courts"
to adjudicate technical issues).
.78 Judge Plager claims that the doctrine of equivalents has contributed to the practice
of drafting claims that are abstract and overly general, and that reigning in the doctrine of
equivalents might encourage patent lawyers to right more straightforward claims. See An
Interview with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Dec. 1993, at 2 (1993) ("As
a basic proposition, you ought to get nothing more than what your claims give you because,
among other things, that will, with all due respect, for the patent prosecution bar to draft
claims that make sense"). However, it seems possible that the source of today's baroque
claiming techniques is the opposite-the abstruseness of claims seems to track the increasing
literalism on the part of the Patent Office, patent lawyers and the courts. Quite possibly,
the effect of diminishing the availability of the doctrine of equivalents could be that patent
lawyers will attempt even more abstract language in an effort to stretch available "literal"
interpretations.
I" It seems inevitable that once a copying test is announced, litigants will routinely claim
copying. Since the accused infringer will theoretically always have access to the pat-
ent-unlike a case of copyright infringement, for example-it will often be difficult to
differentiate between an intent to design around a patent and an intent to copy.
' See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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alence is likely to include aspects of function, behavior, history and
whatever else that might be involved in deciding whether an
accused infringer makes, uses or sells a patented invention. In
contrast, literal infringement is a judicially-created doctrine arising
from a limited, conventionalized reading of the patent statute."' 1
This reading does not represent the triumph of a better, more
objective idea of inventions. It simply is the triumph of a particu-
lar metaphor for inventions-a metaphor in which inventions are
objects with clearly definable boundaries, insides, outsides, and
elements. Under this metaphor, patent laws exist merely to
regulate the trade in these boxes, through a literalist approach to
claim interpretation. However, the patent laws embrace more than
one metaphor for invention. Conventionalizing the INVENTIONS
ARE OBJECTS metaphor submerges other concepts embodied in
the patent system, including the diversity-building incentives found
in the metaphor INVENTIONS ARE DISCOVERIES. Instead of
limiting discourse to achieve an illusory goal of certainty, it may be
wiser to look for even more metaphors.
ROBERT M. MEEKS
181 See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
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